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INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to Rule 50(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Petitioner takes this opportunity to address arguments 
raised in the Brief of Respondent in Opposition to Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Respondent (hereinafter "Deere") has stated misleading 
facts in its brief. Petitioner (hereinafter "Stuart") has 
provided adequate basis for review by writ of certiorari in its 
petition. An award of attorney's fees on appeal in not warranted 
in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I; 
RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS IS MISLEADING. 
Although Stuart clearly stated the scope of requested 
review in its petition for writ of certiorari, Deere, in its Brief 
in Opposition ("Respondent's Brief")/ flooded the Court with 
irrelevant facts. The Court of Appeals ruled that the "Master 
Policy," otherwise know as Retail Installment Sales Policy No. 
IM-14319, was a completely integrated and unambiguous insurance 
contract. Stuart is not requesting a review of this specific 
ruling of the Court of Appeals. In spite of this fact, Deere has 
devoted a large portion of its brief to discussing the so-called 
"certificate of insurance" and other extrinsic and parol evidence, 
in an attempt to further explain the terms of the Master Policy. 
The only facts relevant to this petition are those relevant to 
whether the Master Policy language requires termination of 
insurance upon termination of John Deere's security interest in 
the insured equipment, and those relevant to whether Deere was 
required to give Stuart notice of termination of insurance in this 
case. All other facts, regardless of whether they were relevant 
to the original motion for summary judgment or to the original 
appeal, are not relevant to this petition. 
In addition, on page 15 of Respondent's Brief, Deere 
asserts that Stuart's claim, namely, that Stuart did not receive a 
full refund of insurance premiums until after the date of loss, is 
false. The record, however, refutes such assertion. Page 6 of the 
Statement of Account, kept by John Deere on Stuart's account, 
indicates that an entry was made on March 8, 1988, of a cash 
refund of insurance premiums in the amount of $17.30 (R.44). The 
date on which such cash refund was actually sent to Stuart is not 
stated in the record, but Stuart has always asserted and Deere has 
not refuted, that such insurance refund check was received after 
the date of loss (T.17), which occurred on March 9, 1988 (R.2). 
Because of the misrepresentation of this fact by Deere, and 
because of the numerous irrelevant facts included in Respondent's 
Brief, the Court should carefully scrutinize the facts set forth 
in Respondent's Brief to avoid being misled. 
POINT II 
PETITIONER HAS STATED SUFFICIENT BASIS IN ITS 
PETITION TO MERIT REVIEW BY THE SUPREME COURT 
OF ITS APPEAL BY WRIT OF CERTIORARI. 
On page 14 of Respondent's Brief, Deere states that 
Stuart misunderstands the purpose of a petition for writ of 
certiorari, and that Stuart has merely mimicked arguments made in 
earlier briefs, rather than demonstrating to this Court important 
reasons for review. Deere has obviously overlooked the necessity 
of setting forth the scope of requested review and of briefly 
summarizing the merits of the requested review in order to give 
the Court sufficient background and basis to determine whether 
review by writ of certiorari is appropriate. 
Furthermore, Deere has lamely argued that the writ of 
certiorari should be denied merely because Stuart has stated 
grounds for review of its petition only under one subsection of 
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Subsection (d). 
However, under URAP Rule 46, any one of the considerations set 
forth in Subsections (a) through (d) can provide sufficient basis 
for granting review by writ of certiorari. 
In this case, a novel issue of first impression was 
presented to the Court, namely, whether a termination of 
insurance, triggered by the early payoff of the underlying 
installment contract obligation on the insured property, was 
required by Utah law to be preceded by notice of termination. 
Deere attempts to analogize this case to two other cases ruled 
upon by the Utah Court of Appeals, Godoy v. Farmers Ins. Group, 
759 P.2d 1173, 1175-76 (Utah App. 1988) and Clarke v. American 
Concept Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah App. 1988). The fact 
situation in this case is clearly distinguishable from those in 
the above cited cases of Godoy and Clarke. In those cases, the 
Court of Appeals held that the insurance policy expired on the 
stated maturity date. In this case, Deere unilaterally terminated 
the insurance policy prior to the stated maturity date, and did so 
in such a way that Stuart had no notice whatsoever that the 
insurance had expired. Stuart not only never received a copy of 
the Master Policy, but also never received any recognizable notice 
that a refund of the insurance premium had been made, until after 
the date of loss. Failure to give notice of termination is 
especially deplorable in this case, whereas the cost to Deere of 
giving notice would have been minimal - the cost of postage and 
the cost of processing the paperwork - but the cost to Stuart of 
suffering an uninsured loss will be catastrophic. 
Finally, Stuart has clearly raised the issue of whether 
termination of insurance should have been allowed to occur in this 
case without first giving notice to the insured of such 
termination. Therefore, it is absurd for Deere to suggest that 
this Court cannot consider all law relevant and applicable to the 
correct determination of such issue, whether or not such law was 
cited in Petitioner's Brief. 
POINT III 
AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL IS NOT 
WARRANTED IN THIS CASE. 
Rule 3 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
provides that if an appeal is filed frivolously, that is, if it is 
not grounded in fact nor warranted by existing law, nor based on a 
good faith argument to extend, modify or reverse existing law, 
attorney's fees may be awarded as damages to the prevailing party. 
In this case, as has been explained in Petitioner's Brief, 
Stuart's appeal is grounded in fact, and is based on a good faith 
argument to extend existing law. 
Stuart has presented a unique fact situation to the 
Court, and has requested the Court to determine the applicability 
of Utah Code Annotated statutes requiring insurance companies to 
give notice to the insured prior to termination of insurance. 
Deere argues that Stuart is essentially asking the court to 
legislate state law in requesting such statutes to be applied to 
the fact situation in this case. However, a determination of the 
applicability of Utah statutory law to a particular type of fact 
situation is well within the parameters of the Supreme Court's 
authority to construe statutory law. Therefore, Deere's 
contention is without merit. 
Because the type of insurance contract involved in this 
case is extremely common, and accordingly, because the type of 
fact situation before the court in this case is one that will 
likely recur in the future on a regular basis, Stuart's petition 
presents an important question of state law, which has not, but 
should be settled by the Utah Supreme Court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the additional reasons set forth above, the 
Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to grant Petitioner's 
request for review, by writ of certiorari, of the opinion of the 
Utah Court of Appeals rendered in this case. 
Respectfully submitted this day of March, 1991. 
Douglas M^/Durbano 
Paul H. Johnson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant/Petitioner 
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APPENDIX B 
1 some real factual disputes on damages if the Court rules 
2 against us. But I think, your Honor, Mister — I don't 
3 know if there is a Mr. Stuart. I assume there is. But 
4 Stuart, Inc., got what it paid for here, your Honor. 
5 They were told right up front when they bought this 
6 machinery that this insurance is in effect only as long 
7 as John Deere has a policy — has a secured interest. 
8 And once the purchaser Stuart, Inc., got rid of that 
9 security interest by paying, that term- — that policy 
10 terminated of itself. John Deere had no insurance 
11 policy. And we respectfully ask the Court to grant 
12 summary judgment in John Deere's favor. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
14 I thought you were all through. 
15 MR. DURBANO: Well, I have a few more items real 
16 quick. 
17 THE COURT: Take one minute because, you know, 
18 you're limited between the two of you 15 minutes, and 
19 you've taken more than that now. 
20 MR. DURBANO: Just one moment, your Honor. 
21 I refer the Court to the affidavit of 
22 Terry Digmin. That affidavit has the statement of the 
23 Cat and the payments that were made. Your Honor, I 
24 think this is a little suspect, and that's why I point 
25 it out. It shows that the payoff was made in February. 
1 That's correct. And then it shows a credit to the 
2 account for an insurance refund, charges. And then it 
3 shows an actual refund. It looks like approximately $17 
4 that was made on March 8th, 1988. The accident or the 
5 loss occurred on March 9th, 1988. These documents are 
6 conveniently dated in my opinion. 
7 Next point, your Honor. But the main point or 
8 that, your Honor, my client did not receive a check or 
9 notice of cancellation of the insurance company until 
10 after the date of loss. The law requires that the 
11 contract of insurance be terminated only on notice. My 
12 client never received notice. 
13 Stuart, Inc., was not a part of the 
14 negotiations between the insurance company and John 
15 Deere tractor company. 
16 Finally, when does the security interest 
17 expire? The UCC filings were in place as of March 9, 
18 1988, And I think that is a stipulated fact. 
19 THE COURT: Thank you. I've got some other 
20 documents I'd like to look at. I'm going to take it 
21 under advisement and let counsel know. 
22 MR. DURBANO: Thank you, your Honor. 
23 MR. MORRIS: Thank you, your Honor. 
24 (Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.) 
25 * * * * * 
